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NOTES
EQUITY: RISK OF LOSS
Upon whom, in equity, should the burden of loss fall in
executory contracts for the sale of land where before the time
set for performance the premises are damaged through unavoid-
able accidents?' Since the answer to this question should de-
pend on which of the parties is regarded by the courts as the
owner, in equity, of the premises, it seems illogical to say that
the risk should be borne by the owner from the inception of the
contract.
2
The law governing risk of loss of real property has developed
entirely apart from that concerning sales of chattels and has
taken place chiefly in the equity courts.3 As early as 1724 it
was said by way of dictum 4 that "If I should buy an house, and,
before such time as by the articles I am to pay for the same, the
house be burnt down by casualty of fire, I shall not, in equity,
be bound to pay for the house." Such a result is, of course, in
accordance with that reached at law5 where the loss is made to
fall on the vendor. He is held to have the legal title together
with all incidents of ownership and he can, therefore, neither
recover the unpaid purchase price from the purchaser nor re-
tain any payments which he may have received. Notwithstand-
ing these considerations it became settled law in England that
in equity the purchaser would be regarded as the owner from
the time the agreemnt was entered into and that he should bear
the risk of loss.6
'The attention of the courts has been directed to various forms
of loss: (fire), Paine v. Meller, 6 Yes. Jr. 349 (1801); (flood), Amund-
son v. Severson, 41 S. D. 377, 170 N. W. 633 (1919); (windstorm)-,
Pellegrino v. Giuliani, 118 Misc. 329, 193 N. Y. Supp. 258 (1922); (col-
lapse of building due to natural causes), LAbman v. Leverson, 236
Mass. 221, 128 N. E. 13 (1920).2 Clark, J., in Wilsbn v. Clark, 60 N. H. 352, 353 (1880): "when
property, real or personal, is destroyed by fire, the loss falls upon the
party who is the owner at the time." This would seem to beg the
question.
32 Williston, Contracts, Sec. 931.
Sir Joseph Jekyll, M. R. in Stent v. Bailis, 2 P. Wms. 217, 220
(1724).
bWells v. Calnan, 107 Mass. 514 (1871).
eHartford v. Purrier, I Madd. Ch. 532, 56 Eng. Reprint 195, 16
Rev. Rep. 260 (1816); Michin v. Nance, 4 Beav. 332, 49 Eng. Rep. 367
(1841); Poole v. Adams, 33 L. J. Ch. N. S. 639, 10 L. T. N. S. 287,
12 Week. Rep. 683 (1864),
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The case that settled the law in England was Paine v.
Meller.7 In that case there was a suit for specific performance
of an agreement made in September for the conveyance of
property at Michaelmas. When that time arrived, however,
there was no conveyance made because the seller could not trans-
fer a good title. There was evidence to show that subsequently
the defect in title was remedied to the buyer's satisfaction. De-
cember 18th the house burned. The case has generally been
cited as a decision that the purchaser is liable from the date
of the contract for any loss through accidental destruction, al-
though an eminent authority has stated that it did not decide
the precise question involved here.8
In the United States there has been no such unanimity of
decision as is found in England. The majority of jurisdic-
tions9 adhere to the decision laid down in Paine v. Meller or the
"English rule" as it has been called with, however, a vigorous
minority reaching a contra result.'0 Nearly all courts agree
7 6 Ves. Jr. 349 (1801). Lord Eldon stated: ". . . if the party by
the contract has become in equity the owner of the premises they are
his to all intents and purposes. They are vendible as his; chargeable
as his; they may be devised as his; they may be assets; and they
would descend to his heirs."
" In 1 Harv. L. Rev. 375, Dean Langdell shows that the practice in
England requires thie purchaser to prepare the title papers which are
then presented to the v6ndor for execution, and that in Paine v. Meller
the purchaser was in default and, therefore, the loss should not have
been placed on the vendor. However, Williston in 9 Harv. L. Rev.
112, n. 1, suggests that the purchaser was not in default, since he had
two days in which to prepare the papers.
Hough v. City F. Ins. Co., 29 Conn. 10, 76 Am. Dec. 581 (1860);
Thompson v. Norton, 14 Ind. 187 (1860); Davidson v. Hawkeye Ins.
Co., 71 Iowa 532, 60 Am. Rep. 818, 32 N. W. 514 (1887); Marks v.
Tichenor, 85 Ky. 536, 4 S. W. 225 (1887); Brewer v. Herbert, 30 Md.
301, 96 Am. Dec. 583 (1869); McGinley v. Forrest, 107 Neb. 309, 186
N. W. 74 (1921); Manning v. North British & M. Ins. Co., 123 Mo.
App. 456, 99 S. W. 1095 (1907); Marion v. Woolcott, 68 N. J. Eq. 20,
69 Atl. 242 (1904); Sutton v. Davis, 143 N. C. 474, 55 S. E. 844 (1906);
Woodward v. McCollum, 16 N. D. 42, 111 N. W. 623 (1907); Dunn v.
Karish, 10 Okla. 388, 61 Pac. 926 (1900); Elliott v. Ashland Mut. F.
Ins. Co., 117 Pa. 548, 12 Atl. 676, 2 Am. St. Rep. 703 (1888); Russell v.
Elliott, 45 S. D. 184, 186 N. W. 824 (1922); Barker v. Smith, 3 Sneed
289 (1855); Northern Texas Realty & Constr. Co. v. Lary, 136 S. W.
(Tex.) 843 (1911); Virginian R. Co. v. Jefferies, 110 Va. 471, 66 S. E.
731 (1909); Maudru v. Humphreys, 83 W. Va. 307, 98 S. E. 259 (1919);
Wetzler v. Duffy, 78 Wis. 170, 42 N. W. 184, 12 L. R. A 178 (1890).
°10Conlin v. Osborn, 161 Cal. 659, 120 Pac. 755 (1911); La Chance
v. Brown, 41 Cal. App. 500; 183 Pac. 216 (1919); Smith v. Phoenix
Ins. Co., 91 Cal. 323, 27 Pac. 738, 13 L. R. A. 475, 25 Am. St. Rep. 191
(1891); Gould v. Murch, 70 Me. 288, 35 Am. Rep. 325 (1879); Thomp-
son v. Gould, 20 Pick. (Mass.) 134 (1838); Wells v. Calnan, 107 Mass.
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that pending the time when the vendor will be able to make
good title, the contract is not so complete as to give the pur-
chaser the equitable title, and any loss from injury to or de-
terioration of the premises will fall on the vendor.1" So, too,
the loss must be borne by the vendor when the destruction oc-
curs during the period when performance is delayed due to
his fault 12 or when he has negligently been the cause of the
loss.1 3 However, the conflict over the question at hand is apart
from these points and we find a strong minority placing the
risk of loss, in executory contracts for the sale of land, on the
vendor on the theory that "in every contract for the convey-
ance of property, there is an implied condition that the subject
matter of the contract shall be in existence when the time for the
performance of the contract arrives. ... If it has ceased to exist
when that time arrives, each party is discharged from his con-
tract, the vendor from his contract to convey, the vendee from
paying the purchase price.1'14
Aside from the question of which of the two rules is the
more desirable, the authorities have bickered over the correct-
ness of citing the so-called "minority cases" as applying the
rule that from the inception of the contract until the time for
performance the loss should be borne by the vendor. Of the
cases cited supra as sustaining the minority rule it has been
said that Thompson v. Gotdd and Gould v. Murch are not in
point for the reason that they involved oral contracts unen-
forceable because of the Statute of Frauds and the actions were
at law.15  These facts are, of course, true. However, it would
be well to call attention to the dictum in the former case which
was followed by the court in the latter case and re-expressed :'6
514, 9 Am. Rep. 65 (1871); Kares v. Covell, 180 Mass. 206, 62 N. E.
244, 91 Am. St. Rep. 271 (1902); Hawkes v. Kehoe, 193 Mass. 419, 79
N. E. 766, 10 L. R. A. (ns) 125, 9 Ann. Cas. 1053 (1907); Libman v.
Levenson, 236 Mass. 221, 128 N. E. 13 (1920); Allyn v. Allyn, 154 Mass.
670, 28 N. E. 779 (1891); Adams v. North American Ins. Co., 210 Mass.
550, 96 N. E. 1094 (1912).
'Calhoon v. Belden, 3 Bush 674 (1868); Smith v. McCluskey, 45
Barb. 610 (1866).
' Smith v. Cansler, 83 Ky. 367 (1885); Bostwick v. Beach, 105
N. Y. 661, 12 N. E. 32 (1887).
"Kincheloe v. Smith, 28 Ky. L. Rep. 1329, 91 S. W. 1145 (1906);
Good v. Jarrard, 93 S. 0. 229, 76 S. E. 698, 43 L. R. A. (ns) 383 (1912).14Powell v. Dayton, S. & G. R. R. Co., 12 Ore. 488, 8 Pac. 544(1885).
Pound, The Progress of the Law, 33 Harv. L. Rev. 813, 827, n. 72.
uThompson v. Gould, 20 Pick. 134, 140 (1838).
EQUITY: IISx OF Loss
-... we therefore cannot recognize the fiction in equity, by which
a purchase and an agreemnt to purchase are held to be similar,
and indeed identical in respect to the present question.... Where
the contract is entire, the vendor cannot recover or retain part
of the purchase money, where he cannot convey or make a good
title to the whole estate sold."
Of the remaining minority cases it has been said, with
various reasons given, that they too are not in point and are not
inconsistent with the majority rule. 17 Be that as it may. The
purpose of this paper is not to analyze each case on the subject
with a view toward making a statistical survey, but merely to
set out the condition of the law as it exists today. Therefore,
it is left to the reader to accept whichever of these views he
deems correct. Suffice it to say that generally these minority
cases have almost without contradiction been cited as being
contra to the English rule by writers of law review articles and
notes.'
The authorities have given various explanations as to how
the result in equity has been reached. It has been said that in
equity the vendor is trustee for the purchaser and that since
the vendee stands in the position of cestui que trust he must
", Supra, n. 15. "In two more cases, Phinizy v. Guernsey, 111 Ga.
346, 36 S. E. 796 (1900) (containing, by the way, a dictum in favor of
the equity doctrine), and Good v. Jarrard, 93 S. C. 229, 76 S. E. 698(1912), the vendor-purchaser relation had not attached at the time of
the loss because condition precedent remained unfulfilled; in two
more, Wells v. Calnan, 107 Mass. 514 (1871), Powell v. Dayton Co.,
12 Ore. 488, 8 Pac. 544 (1885), the action was brought at law by the
vendor. In none of these cases was the equitable doctiine as to risk
of loss in any way involved. In the first four, purchaser could not
have been compelled to take regardless of the loss. In the last two,
when vendor sued at law for a breach he could not claim that pur-
chaser was equitable owner. For the rest, Cutcliff v. McAnally, 88
Ala. 507, 512, 7 So. 331 (1889), is not even a strong dictum; David-
son v. Insurance Co., 71 Ia. 532, 534, 32 N. W. 514 (1887), was a ques-
tion of construction of an insurance policy; Kares v. Covell, 180 Mass.
206, 62 N. E. 244 (1902), and Bautz v. Kuhworth, 1 Mont. 133, 136(1869), were actions at law and in Bautz v. Kuhworth, plaintiff did not
even show a breach at law on the part of vendbr. One case thoroughly
in point on this side is Wilson v. Clark, 60 N. I. 352 (1880); a suit in
equity by purchaser. But this case relies on Thompson v. Gould with-
out any discussion and without noting that the contract there was un-
enforceable in equity and did not raise the question which it is
assumed was decided."
S22 A. L. R. 575, 578; 4 Notre Dame Lawyor 506; 6 Minn. L. Rev.
513; 2 Wis. L. Rev. 174; 79 U. of Pa. L. R. 2391; 29 Mich. L. Rev. 487;
2 Williston, Contracts, Sec. 928.
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bear the burdens of that relationship ;19 that equity regards as
done, that which ought to be done ;20 and that at the moment
of the sealing of the contract a conversion in equity takes place;
the realty of the vendor is converted into personalty and the
purchase money of the vendee is converted into realty.21 Since
the last of these theories is the basis for most of the decisions
placing the burden of loss on the vendee an analysis of the doc-
trine seems appropriate here.
Although it has often been suggested that the doctrine of
equitable conversion or equitable ownership, as it has also been
called, was first promulgated by Lord Eldon in Seaton v. Slade22
it is believed by the writer that it had a much earlier origin.
As early as 1735 it was said that "the rule .... is, that what
ought to have been done, shall be taken as done, and a rule so
powerful it is, as to alter the very nature of things; to make
money land, and on the contrary, to turn land into money.' '23
However, the rule as commonly stated and followed by most
of the decisions may be found in Lysaght v. Edwards24 where
it is said that a "valid contract actually changes the ownership
of the estate in equity."
It would seem that when the theory of equitable conversion
was applied to risk of loss cases the courts made a false analogy
to the devolution of land cases where it had previously been
used. In those cases there was no problem of risk of loss and
the two questions are entirely divorced in nature. It cannot
follow from the fact that for some purposes (devolution of
estates), the vendee is in equity dealt with as the owner of the
realty, that he should be so dealt with for all purposes, and that
consequently in risk of loss cases the burden should fall on the
purchaser just as the burden of loss of trust property falls upon
the cestui que trust.
19 "Rightly or wrongly. . . the vendee... has been given in equity
rights analogous to those of the cestui que trust, with substantially the
benefits of equitable ownership. As a necessary consequence.. . he
must bear, as one of the burdens of ownership, the loss involved in the
destruction of property." Keener, The Burden of Loss, 1 Col. L. Rev.
1, 10.
2Brewer v. Herbert 30 Md. 301, 96 Am. Dec. 583 (1869).
5 Pomeroy, Eq. Jur. Sec. 2282.
27 Ves. Jr. 265, 273 (1802).
Lechmere v. Carlisle, 2 P. Wms. 211, 215, 24 Eng. Rep. 1633, 1635
(1733).
'2 Ch. D. 499, 507, 34 L. T. 787 (1876), Jessel, M. R.
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It has been suggested 25 that the effect of placing the risk
zf loss on the purchaser from the time the contract is entered
into is, in effect, holding that the performance of a contract en-
forced in equity relates back to the time of making the contract.
This analysis seems to expose one of the fallacies in the doctrine
of equitable conversion as applied to risk of loss cases for when
an act done at one time relates to a different time, the relation
is, of course, a legal fiction. Since the only possible justification
for the adoption of a legal fiction is that thereby more perfect
justice can be done the question arises: Can more perfect justice
be done by applying this fiction to risk of loss cases? An at-
tempt will be made to answer this query further on, but in
passing it should be pointed out that no "greater injustice
could be inflicted than by shifting the consequences of an act
of God from A, upon whom it has fallen, to B, upon whom it
did not fall,-who was confessedly in no way responsible for the
act, and who has done no wrong whatever to A, whether by com-
mitting a tort or by breaking an obligation." 26
There would seem to be at least one limitation on the
doctrine of equitable conversion that should argue strenuously
against its use in the risk of loss cases. The theory of equitable
ownership of land is an incident of the right to specific per-
formance; it cannot exist apart from it.2 7 Therefore, in a given
= Langdell, A Brief Survey of Eq. Jur., p. 60.
"8 Ibid., p. 61. But see Keener, The Burden of Loss, 1 Col. L. Rev.
1, 8, where it is said that the doctrine of equitable conversion has no
basis in the doctrine of relation back; "in view of the position takenin equity as to the vendee's rights, there is no greater reason for in-
voking such a doctrine. . ., than there would be to invoke the doc-
trine of relation in the case of a mortgagor or mortgagee, if the ques-
tion came up as to whether the mortgagor or the mortgagee should
bear the loss, consequent upon the destruction of property, while in
the possession of the mortgagee. If the loss is to be thrown upon the
vendee it is because he is in equity substantially the owner of theproperty, and, as a consequence, justice requires that having the bene-
fits he should bear the burden of ownership. It is because of his
equitable, not his legal, ownership that the vendee should bear the
loss."
"Haynes v. Haynes, 1 Dr. and Sm. 426, 452 (1861), Kindersley,
V. C.: "The only reason why a contract by the owner of land for the
sale of it to another operates to effect conversion is, that a court of
equity will compel hini specifically to perform his contract. Conver-
sion as arising from a contract to sell is merely and exclusively the
consequence of the application by a court of equity of the doctrine of
specific performance. Where there can be no specific performance,
there can be no conversion." Cited by Stone, Equitable Conversion by
Contract, 13 Col. L. Rev. 371, 386.
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case, before it can be determined whether or not the purchaser
should be regarded as the equitable owner it must first be de-
cided by the court if there is a valid contract which ought to
be specifically performed at the time the court is called upon to
enforce it. Thus, the question arises, should a contract be
specifically enforced when at that time a part of the subject
matter, which the vendor impliedly agreed would be in existence
at the time of performance, has been destroyed? Strangely
enough, however, in those jurisdictions which place the burden
of loss on the vendee this order of reasoning is reversed and the
courts lead themselves into the following won sequitur: "equi-
table ownership of the vendee in the subject matter of the con-
tract can exist only where the contract is one which equity will
specifically perform. The vendee of land is equitably entitled to
land, therefore the vendee may be compelled to perform, although
the vendor is unable to give in return the performance stipulated
for by his contract. '"28 How it is possible for performance to
be had because of the equitable ownership of land by the vendee,
which in turn depends upon the right to specific performance,
has not been explained. Certainly the result does not find itself
as has been so often said, in the presumed intention of the par-
ties. Rather it is brought about by the use of an arbitrary fic-
tion,-by operation of a rule of law regardless of the parties'
intent. This tendency is aptly illustrated by the case of Pel-
legrino v. Giuliani2 9 where the contract expressly provided that
the risk of loss or damage by fire should be assumed by the seller
until delivery of the deed. The premises were damaged by a
windstorm and it was held that the vendee should bear the loss,
although he was apparently neither in possession nor entitled
to possession.
The reason for placing the risk of loss on the vendee has
been said by many authorities to be upon the hypothesis that
from the time the owner of an estate enters into a binding agree-
ment for its sale he holds the same in trust for the purchaser,30
who, as cestui que trust, is the equitable owner of the property
."See Stone, Equitable Conversion by ontract, 13 Col. L. Rev.
371, 386.
19118 Misc. 329, 193 N. Y. Supp. 258 (1922).
3 Brewer v. Herbert, 30 Md. 301, 96 Am. Dec. 583 (1869); Pomeroy,
Eq. Jur. Sec. 1406.
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and who must bear, as one of the consequences of ownership,
the loss involved in the destruction of the property.31
Considering the problem in the light of recognized trust
principles this reasoning seems faulty. No trustee is entitled
to profit by his position and he cannot take beneficially the
rents and profits from the trust res, yet that is what a vendor
may do and the purchaser cannot require of him an accounting
for the rents and profits. If because the purchaser is the equi-
table owner he must pay the purchase price, even though the
premises have been destroyed, it may reasonably be argued that
he is not the equitable owner in the sense that that phrase is
usually understood but in some extraordinary or qualified sense.
Even if we do say that in a certain sense the vendor and vendee
occupy positions analogous to that of trustee and cestui que trust
it must be admitted that the relationship owes its being to the
fact that there is a contract which can be specifically enforced.
Therefore, there is a trust because there is an enforceable con-
tract; the former exists because the latter exists. And yet, those
courts which say that the risk of loss should be borne by the
vendee because he is in the position of a cestui, in effect say that
the contract must be specifically performed because a trust
exists, thereby inverting the true state of affairs and substitut-
ing cause for effect. Since the trust is a mere result of the
contract it would seem proper to make it, the trust, conform to
the intention of the parties as evidenced by the contract.
Regarding the question from another angle, does it follow
from the fact that the vendee is a cestui, and must consequently
bear the loss of the trust res,'that he must pay the purchase
price to the vendor who cannot perform 32 If it is true that a
cestud must bear the losses occurring without fault of the trustee
it means that he has lost his equitable estate and cannot hold
the trustee responsible. Likewise, in the case of vendor and pur-
chaser, if the subject matter of the contract is destroyed, the
latter loses his equitable estate and the later is not, on that ac-
count, responsible to the vendor. Evidently, then, the law of
trusts does not call upon the vendee to pay. If he must pay at
all, then, it must be because he is obligated by contract and if
ISee to this effect: Keener, The Burden of Loss, 1 Col. L. Rev.
1, 10.
S ee note, 12 Col. L. Rev. 257.
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he is, then it must be on the theory that the vendor has per-
formed or is able to. However, equity not only deems the vendor
a trustee, but regards the trust obligation as his only one, argu-
ing that since the trustee is not to blame for the loss he is not
in default, and since he is not in default, it follows that the
vendee must fulfill his obligation. But this view assumes that
because the vendor is a trustee he is released from his promise
to convey. This is, of course, fallacious, for the reason that
there is nothing in the nature of the trust obligation which
excuses that imposed by contract.
Concerning the maxim that equity regards as done that
which ought to be done and that therefore the vendee will, from
the inception of the contract, be considered, in equity, as the
owner, it seems sufficient to point out that present ownership
is a very different thing from future ownership. "However,
certain it may be that in the future one will become the owner
of property, it is a very different thing from owning it now.
When, therefore, it is said that equity regards one who has a
contract right to property in the future as the immediate owner
of it, it is in effect said that equity regards two things which
are inherently different as the same." 33
As a further argument that the risk of loss should always
be on the vendee, an eminent authority34 has grouped certain
rules of equity to show its consistent treatment of the vendee as
owner or mortgagor. These have been commented on by Pro-
fessor Williston3 5 and the rules with his comments are sub-
stantially as follows:
I. The vendee can call for a conveyance of the property
from a donee, or purchaser with notice.
It is true that a contract for the sale of real estate can
be enforced not only against the vendor but also against any-
one who takes from him with notice. M oreover, by registration
the vendee can charge everyone with notice. But it is also true
that one who has only an option to buy and who is not called
312 Williston, Contracts, Sec. 929. "Only the hoary age and fre-
quent repetition of the maxim prevent a general recognition of its
absurdity."
-'Supra, note 31.
1u5 HTra, note 33, at Sec. 936.
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an owner in equity and whom no one saddles with the risk, has
the same right.30
II. The interest of the vendee can be assigned or devised.
The same can also be said of the holder of an option.37
III. In the event of the vendee's death, his heir, not his
personal representative, is entitled to a conveyance.
"In regard to inheritance of property and dower
rights therein after a contract to sell, it should be observed that
the question here is not between vendor and purchaser, but be-
tween classes of inheritors, all of whom are in the position of
volunteers. It may be entirely proper for equity to arrange
the rule of inheritance in accordance with the intention of the
owner to change the nature of the property at a future time. The
vendor has indicated an intent to convert his real estate into
personalty, and the purchaser an intent to convert personal
estate into realty, and there is no reason why the intent should
not be regarded. The question is not ordinarily at what time
the conversion is to be dated, but whether there is any conver-
sion. Where the former question arises, it is noticeable that
the profits of land under contract of sale belong to the vendor's
heir until the day fixed for conveyance. 'Whatever the basis o,.
the rule in question, it does not violate any principle of contracts.
Moreover, it seems probable on the authorities that even where
the purchaser's contractual right to a conveyance is subject
to a condition, other than the payment of the price, that this
rule of inheritance will nevertheless be applied if the condition
was one which the purchaser could have performed. Yet, it
seems clear that the risk of loss would not be thrown on the pur-
chaser in such a case under the English equitable doctrine. Thus,
where the purchaser has a mere option when the vendor dies, on
the exercise of the option the vendor's executor, not his heir,
has been given the purchase money.''38
IV. Under a devise by the vendee of his real estate, the
interest of the vendee passes.
See comment to rule Number III, supra.
Citing Ross v. Parks, 93 Ala. 153, 8 So. 368, 11 L. R. A. 148, 30
Am. St. Rep. 47 (1890); Thompson v. Henry, 85 Mo. 451 (1885).
31 See 2 Williston, Contracts, Sec. 415.
31bid., at Sec. 936,-citing Townley v. Bedwell, 14 Ves. 591 (1808).
L. J.-10
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V. In jurisdictions where a wife is given dower in equi-
table estates, the widow of the vendee is entitled to dower.
See comment to rule Number III, supra.
VI. The vendee has a right to require husbandlike con-
duct of the vendor in the management of the estate.
Although this is true, the same may be said not only
of the vendor's right against a purchaser in possession but also
of the right of the holder of an option. Surely one who has
given an option, for valuable consideration, cannot thereafter
be allowed to misuse the property.3 9
VII. The vendee is chargeable with the costs of improve-
ments made by the vendor under compulsion of law.
If this be true then it operates to destroy one of the
arguments most commonly advanced for throwing the risk of
loss on the purchaser; namely, that the chance of gain is his
also. In the case supposed he is made to pay an additional
price for improvements. 40
VIII. The vendee is chargeable with taxes paid by the
vendor beyond the value of the usufruct.
It is well settled that the vendor must bear the
burden of taxes until the purchaser is entitled to possession.4 1
IX. An estate which a vendor has contracted to sell will
pass under a will to a devisee to whom the vendor has devised
the estate held in trust by him.
See comment to rule Number III, supra.
X. The property is no longer liable for the debts of the
vendor.
It is, of course, true that the creditors of the vendor
cannot by seizing the property destroy the purchaser's interest
but this only goes to show that equity regards the purchaser as
having an interest and does not explain the extent of that in-
terest. On the other hand, it should be observed that only through
=Ibid.
40 Ibid.
"Ibid. Citing Sherman v. Savery, 2 Fed. 505 (1880); Natl. Bank
V. Danforth, 80 Ga. 55, 7 S. E. 546 (1887); Brown v. Brown, 124 Mo. 79,
27 S. W. 552 (1894).
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a bill in equity can creditors of the purchaser seize the property
and it is not subject to execution until the price has been paid.42
In addition to setting out what seems to the writer a
thorough refutation of any application of the above rules to the
question here, Professor Williston points out that certain well
settled rules negative any argument that the purchaser stands
in the position of a mortgagor. (1) It is a well settled rule of
mortgage law that no agreemnet of forfeiture between mortga-
gor and mortgagee for non-payment on time will be enforced.43
Also, it is well settled in the law of vendors and purchasers
that an agreement that time shall be of the essence, will be en-
forced. 44 And even though the contract does not make time of
the essence, either party by giving a reasonable notice to the
other, requiring him to perform within a stated reasonable
time, may make such performance a condition of his own fur-
ther liability.45 (2) The purchaser is not entitled to possession
of the premises unless the contract expressly gives him that
right 40 nor can he lay claim to the rents and profits until the
time when he is entitled to possession.4 7 (3) If the vendor is
in possession he is liable for taxes.48
Various solutions to this perplexing problem have been
offered. The one that is probably foremost among these, and
which seeks to change the present "equitable ownership" rule,
is that suggested by Professor Williston.49 His position is that
the intention of the parties should always control; that although
4'Ibid. "These rules must therefore be dropped from considera-
tion in any argument concerning the purchaser's risk of loss. They
evidently do not depend upon the existence of a situation where the
purchaser must be said to have ownership in equity as distinct from
an interest less than such full beneficial ownership as should carry
with it risk of loss."
'
3 Citing Seymour v. Mackay, 126 Ill. 341, 18 N. E. 552 (1888).
"Citing Woodruff v. Semi-Tropic Co., 87 Cal. 275, 25 Pac. 354(1890).
'Citing Harding v. Olson, 177 Ill. 298, 52 N. E. 482 (1898).
"Citing Gates v. McLean, 70 Cal. 42, 11 Pac. 489 (1886).
"Citing Tucker v. McLaughlin-Farrar Co., 36 Okla. 321, 129 Pac.
5 (1912).
"Citing Hall v. Ely (N. J. Eq.), 108 Atl. 390. Therefore, concludes
Willist6n, "one who admits that the relation of vendor and purchaser
is not in legal effect that of mortgagee and mortgagor, though he is
not precluded from asserting that one who has contracted to purchase
has some incidents of ownership, cannot fairly argue that those inci-
dents justify the transfer of risk from the vendor, who retains not
only the legal title, but some at least of the incidents of beneficial
ownership."
02 Williston, Contracts, See. 940.
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they frequently fail to make provision as to risk, they do indi-
cate whether they intend a present transfer of the rights of
ownership or a future transfer and evidently they expect all the
incidents of ownership to pass at that time. It frequently hap-
pens that the purchaser is given immediate possession with the
right to use it as his own to the same extent as is customary
with a mortgagor, the title being retained merely as security
for the purchase price. In such case, Mr. Williston argues, an
equitable result is reached by placing the risk of loss on the
purchaser on the transfer of possession.
Such a rule has much to commend it. Very often the real
intention of the parties, which should govern every case, is
readily ascertained by the fact that possession has been trans-
ferred to the purchaser and thereby he is endowed with every
conceivable evidence of ownership except legal title, which, as
pointed out above, is retained by the seller merely as security
for the purchase price. It is a short way of accomplishing the
same end as would be achieved by conveying to the purchaser
and taking a mortgage back. However, the suggestion of this,
the "possession theory", as a rule to be used in risk of loss cases,
has been severely criticised, 50 and it is significant to note that
the courts have not accepted it to any extent. This is evi-
denced by the attitude of the court in Amundson v. Severson.5 1
In that case the contract was made in October, 1909, and the
purchaser went into possession in March, 1910. Most of the
0 Pound, The Progress of the Law, 33 Harv. L. Rev. 813, 826, n. 68.
"There is practically no authority for this view. It is suggested by and
argued as the analogy of the law as to sales of chattels. But three im-
portant distinctions have to be noted. (1) A contract for the sale of
a chattel gives rise to no real right; such a right arises only upon
transfer of the legal title. In equity, on the other hand, a contract for
the sale of lands gives rise to a real right from the time when the
contract is in the class of specifically enforceable undertakings. In-
deed, todlay, when in most jurisdictions the purchaser can record his
contract and thus charge everyone with constructive notice of his
rights, he is often better protected in his equitable ownership than a
cestui que trust. (2) In case of a chattel, it is expedient to cast the
risk of loss on the one in possession because that puts pressure on
him to care for it. In case of a building, the one in possession exer-
cises his possession through having his property in the building, and
the presence of his property therein is enough to induce him to care
for the risk of fire, even if the building is at another's risk. (3) Pos-
session is not material with respect to the possessing or existence of
either legal or equitable title to land. Why, then, should it be material
as to the incidents of equitable title?"
-170 N. W. (S. D.) 633 (1919).
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land was washed away by the Missouri River in 1913. There-
after the vendor procured a good title. As a condition precedent
to the vendor-purchaser relationship had not been fulfilled at
the date of loss and the purchaser could not have been compelled
to take as things then stood the risk was held to be on the
vendor, although the purchaser was in possession. Evidently
the court did not find possession to be a material factor in de-
termining upon whom the risk of loss rests in equity.
Another authority who disputes the correctness of the ma-
jority rule suggests that a better result would be reached by
making the rule in equity the same as that in law.5 2 That is to
say, let the risk of loss remain on the vendor until the time
agreed upon for the conveyance of the legal title, and there-
after on the purchaser, unless the vendor is then in such de-
fault as to be unable to specifically enforce the contract. How-
ever, it has been pointed out 53 that this is objectionable in that
if no time is set for performance, it would be quite inconvenient
to have the risk determined by such an uncertain test as the
lapse of a reasonable time. Because of that objection the pre-
vailing rule, even though it is unnecessary for the adequate
protection of the vendor, is preferable since the time of the
completion of the contract is usually easy to ascertain.
Perhaps the better reasoned s6lution and the one that
more nearly tonforms to the intention of the parties is that put
forth by Professor Vanneman.54 Under it there would be no
hard and fast rule for the courts to apply to every ease; in-
stead they would find and effectuate the intention of the parties
in each case. In cases involving the simplest group of operative
facts the same rule that is used at law would be applied. In
more complex situations all of the incidents of ownership would
be considered: The care of the property, including mainte-
nance, repairs and management; the duty to exercise good
husbandry on the part of the one responsible for the property
5 Langdell, A Brief Survey of Eq. Jur., p. 59. A similar solution
has been offered by Stone, Equitable Conversion by Contract, 13 Col.
L. Rev. 398, 385-387.
3 Clark, Some Problems in Specific Performance, 31 Harm. L. Rev.
271, 287. Clark suggests that the vendor would be "given reasonably
adequate protection, if the courts had held the risk to possession at
the time the vendor puts the purchaser in default, by a proper offer
of performance."
Vanneman, Risk of Loss, 8 Minn. L. Rev. 127, 141-143.
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and to avoid waste; the obligation to pay taxes; the privilege
of keeping the property insured; the right to the returns from
the property. The incidents of ownership should all have weight
in determining the intention of the parties and they do not
always, of necessity, follow possession. "It might well happen
that by the contract the purchaser was given immediate posses-
sion but that the vendor retained the duty of making repairs, or
the obligation to pay taxes, and of keeping up insurance.''"
Under such a rule possession may or may not be controlling.
The entire matter is left to the discretion of the courts; they
are to weigh the divided incidents of ownership and gather
therefrom the true intention of the parties.
The minority rule which places the risk of loss on the vend-
or has sound argument to sustain it. Certainly it accords
with natural justice. Even though that topic embodies many
varying views it would seem that in construing contracts no
rule could be more just than to aim to discover the intention
of the parties and therefore to place the risk on the vendee if
they intend an immediate transfer and on the vendor if they
intend a future transfer. That is to say, intent to transfer
ownership should always control. Unless a contract is in viola-
tion of public policy it is the duty of the courts to enforce that
agreement and not to substitute one entirely foreign to the in-
tention of the parties. And yet that is exactly what is done
when the courts hold the purchaser to be the owner in equity
from the inception of the contract, even though there is certain-
ly no public policy requiring the purchaser to be the owner
any sooner than the agreement specified. Of course, more than
often the parties manifest no intention as to risk of loss except
as it may be inferred from all of the provisions of the contract.
And in thatevent the only ground for contending that the risk
should be thrown on the vendee is because of his supposed
equitable ownership. However, if, after the contract is made,
certain incidents of ownership, both legal and equitable, pass
to the vendee and others are retained by the vendor, the risk
should still remain with the latter since he should not be allowed
to hold the vendee to his promise to pay until he, the vendor,
has delivered all-not merely part-of what he agreed to give.
There seems to be no good reason for the opposite results
55 Ibid., p. 141.
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reached at law and equity. If a purchaser should make a
promise to pay expressly conditioned on receiving the property
in good order, certainly a court of equity could disregard such
a stipulation no more than could a court of law. Then how is it
possible, where the purchaser's promise is in terms absolute,
for a court of law to hold such a stipulation subject to an im-
plied condition of performance by the vendor when equity
reaches a directly contrary result? If equity requires the pur-
chaser to accept a tender of a deed in spite of the destruction
of the property, and to pay the full price, a refusal of such a
tender should ground an action at law. Certainly the result
reached in equity is inconsistent with the settled law of implied
conditions, which is that there is a failure of, consideration for
a promise if the performance promised in return is not given.
Can it be argued that a promise to convey an estate is fulfilled
by conveying only a part of it?
It should aid in this problem to ask what, at the time of
the bargain, did the vendor intend to sell. What did the pur-
chaser intend to buy? If a building was on the land and was
a material portion of the estate than its value was a considerable
fraction of the price. Therefore, it seems reasonable to say that
the vendor intended to sell and the vendee intended to buy land
with a building on it, not land without a building or with a
damaged building. If the attention of the parties had been
directed to risk of loss they would have undoubtedly stipulated
that it was to be on the vendor until consummation of the con-
tract.56
Certain clear advantages are secured by allowing the risk
of loss to remain on the vendor and it seems to the writer that
the minority rule has decidedly the better argument. In doubt-
ful cases it seems far better to let the loss lie where it falls,
since this saves litigation and concomitant useless expense.
Also, it is probably wiser to have the party in possession, usu-
ally the vendor, care for it at his peril rather than have one not
in possession care for it at his peril. This, of course, does not
mean that possession should control every case. As pointed out
by Mr. Vanneman, supra, possession is merely one of the things
to consider, although it is an important item and more than
1 Stone says that the "almost universal practice" is to throw risk
on the vendor. 13 Col. L. R. 387.
KENTuCiKY LAw JouRNAL,
often it may swing the decision. Of course, if the vendor in
possession is negligent and owing to his negligence the prop-
erty is damaged, the loss is his under any view, but there might
be quite a difference in not being so negligent as to be liable and
taking such care as would be induced by a personal interest in
the consequences. Then, too, it is difficult to prove a vendor in
possession negligent.
Considering this matter in the light of all that has been
discussed here, it would seem that too long have our courts tol-
erated the doctrine of equitable conversion which operates to
throw the risk of loss on the vendee. Common sense, business
experience and usage, and theoretical analysis of the problems
involved, all militate against the use of this fiction. And be-
sides, as pointed out above, it fails to produce the justice
which, after all, is the only excuse for its employment. So long
as such a result prevails in our courts, the common law is re-
strained in what is probably its most important characteristic,
namely, its capacity for expansion and growth.
ALBET R. JONEs,
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